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I. Introduction
According to estimates developed for this paper, the beforetax rate of return on fixed capital and inventories in U.S. manufacturing industries declined by over 50 percent from 1949 to 1986.
The paper elaborates a fixed-coefficient capital,
labor, intermediates production model, estimates the wage shareprofit rate frontier (hereafter the wage-profit frontier)
corresponding to it, and suggests the following explanation.
From 1949 to 1970, profits were squeezed by a rise in the wage share, accounting for most of the roughly 40 percent decline in profitability. Declines in the output-capital ratio and relative raw material prices offset one another over this interval. From 1970 From to 1986 , the wage share declined, yet the rate of profit declined another 15 percent. Since raw material prices fell in the 1980s to 1960s levels, a reduced output-capital ratio emerges the likely source of reduced profitability. Indeed, the persistent decline in the output-capital ratio suggests that technical change has a capital-using bias.
The explanation compares with that of Bruno and Sachs (1985) , who assume a putty-putty production function with Harrod neutral technical change. In this model, the profit squeeze that occured in the 1960s caused capital deepening as an effect of rising product wages measured in efficiency units of labor.
By extension, a period of falling product wages capital shallowing. 
The wage-profit frontier is
w -Wage share in total output, WL/PX Pi -Relative price of i, Pi/P One advantage of this framework is that it does not require us to specify the time-dependent movement of labor productivity.
The wage share in total output uses the BEA estimate of total compensation in manufacturing divided by the total output estimate from the BLS Time Series Data for Input-Output Industries.
The price deflator for total output comes from the same BLS source. The BLS data begin in 1958, and have been extrapolated backwards with shipments (for total output) and the Producer Price Index for Finished Goods (for price deflator).
To aid interpretation of the results, and the narrative drawn from them, consider the slope and intercepts of (2). The
Rg intercept is (1 -mpm -npn)/a(t)pK or the ratio of GDP to capital stock. It declines if the total output-capital ratio 5 falls, or if either intermediate price rises.
The raw material price changes described above account for much interesting variation in this intercept, but the decline in the total output-capital ratio reduces it secularly. The w-intercept is
(1 -mpm -npn) or the ratio of GDP to total output. Raw material price increases thus shift the frontier toward the origin, while declines in the total output-capital ratio rotate the frontier about its w-intercept, ceteris paribus.
III. Estimates of the Wage-Profit Frontier
Because OLS versions of equation (2) 1986 is about the same or slightly larger than it was in the early 197Os, and that it is larger than it was in the 1960s.
Thus, since they share an intercept, comparison of the 1986 and 1970s frontiers in figure 1 dramatizes the importance of 8 declining capital productivity, which has rotated the frontier inward over this interval. The remaining two sections address alternative interpretations of a simultaneously falling wage share,6 output-capital ratio, and rate of profit.
IV. A Neoclassical Interpretation?
Since many readers will suspect that the decline in the output-capital ratio reflects traditional capital deepening, which has been assumed away by the KLNM model, I present some weak evidence to the contrary. Bruno and Sachs's (1985) estimates of the wage rate-profit rate frontier for U.S. manufacturing invite comparison. They assume a capital, labor, materials production function weakly separable in materials.
Capital and labor produce value added in a Cobb-Douglas function;
value added and materials produce output in a CES function; there are constant returns to scale. Technical change is assumed to be Harrod neutral, and to be uniform through time.
The model is estimated by7 (3) log(R) = bg + bl Time + b2 log(W/PPI) + b3 log(Pm/PPI) + b4 log(FRB Capacity Utilization) The remaining estimates suggest that (3) is misspecified.
Enlarging the sample backwards, coefficients remain plausible (technical progress runs at 1.6 percent per year, the material share is about 28 percent). The Durbin-Watson, however, drops to just below its lower limit. Further, both estimate 1 and 2 generate out-of-sample forecasts for 1979-81 that overshoot by around 3 to 4 percentage points. Adding these three years to the sample, in estimate 3, pushes the Durbin statistic well below its lower limit. More disturbing, the coefficients no longer have plausible values; note, in particular the negative sign on the trend. One suspects that these are symptoms of a fairly major specification problem.
All this is no reason to reject a capital deepening explanation. Applied models of this type are chosen for their utility and this one gave its authors great insight into the issue they addressed (specifically, the impact of raw material price shocks on the wage rate-profit rate frontier). More importantly, the above overstates the case.
Capital productivity does increase from 1972 to 1977 (see column 8 of table 1) although this is sensitive to the choice of utilization index.
The remaining section elaborates the alternative account of technical change that led me to adopt the approach of the present paper, rather than, for example, to search for a putty-putty translog version of the KLNM model.9
V.
An Alternative Interpretation
To those well-versed in such matters, the rising capitaloutput ratio might seem to be a confirmation of Marx's rising organic composition of capital, with its attendant Gesetz des In U.S. manufacturing product wages rose less sharply than total average labor productivity from 1970 to 1986, forming an interesting historical experiment which lies between the polar cases noted. Can the basic logic of Roemer's model be applied to it? Viable, capital-using, labor-saving technical changes will not necessarily reduce the rate of profit if they increase labor productivity sufficiently more than product wages and so compensate for the increase in capital per unit of output they
require.
An increase in the capital-output ratio itself neither confirms nor denies the existence of a falling rate of profit induced by technical change; among others, the issue of precisely how product wages are linked to technical change remains.11 The decline in the wage share, increase in capital per unit of output, and decline in the rate of profit which coexist from 1970 to 1986 accent the importance of theorems applying to this intermediate case.
VII. Summary
By estimating the wage share-profit rate frontier for U.S. manufacturing industry, it is possible to answer, in a broad way, the rhetorical question posed by the title of this paper. 
4.
A straightforward rationale for the choice of capacity utilization adjustment is that it removes much of the bulge in the rate of profit during the 196Os, correctly, I think, identifying it with high levels of activity. See Bruno and Sachs (1985, Fig. 2A .3, p. 55) for a comparison between actual and adjusted rates that agrees with this interpretation. Had figure   1 been generated using the FRB index, the data points during this period would appear to wander off to the northeast. Notes: Absolute t-statistic is in parenthesis. The dependent variable is (1 -w) X 100. Notes:
The absolute t-statistic is in parenthesis dependent variable is the log of the profit rate. 
